Iran’s Energy Crisis Drives Closer Ties With Russia And China

By Uriel Araujo

Tehran’s failing grid and worsening drought highlight a structural crisis years in the making. In that context, sanctions have only accelerated Iran’s turn toward Russia and China. The backfiring result might be deeper Eurasian integration, with wide geopolitical consequences.

Iran is entering a new and decisive phase of its modern history. Facing recurring blackouts, worsening water shortages, and an overstretched power grid, Tehran is now making a clear and bold energy shift — moving the Islamic Republic closer to Russia and China. This strategic realignment has been underreported in Western media, even though its consequences stretch far beyond Iran’s domestic scene.

One may recall that just a few years ago Tehran was exerting its own confident “oil diplomacy”, as I wrote back in 2021, sending fuel to energy-strapped Lebanon and positioning itself as a regional provider rather than an actor seeking assistance. At the time, Iran’s fuel shipments even helped Hezbollah address Lebanon’s shortages.

Things have changed. Today, the Persian nation faces a domestic energy crisis severe enough to force rationing, emergency measures; not to mention using heavy mazut as fuel despite its toxic implications for public health. Tehran’s pollution emergency is well documented, with smog contributing to deadly environmental crises in the capital.

Moreover, Iran’s energy crisis cannot be understood apart from its worsening water crisis. President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that Tehran will face evacuations if rainfall does not increase soon. Some reports even claim the government is considering relocating the capital altogether — an almost unthinkable undertaking, yet a telling sign of how dire the situation has become.

The combined stress on hydropower, agriculture, and urban consumption reveals a structural vulnerability years in the making. Critics mention mismanagement, but, in addition to this, the truth is that climate pressure, as well as sanctions have all converged. Iran’s own energy ministry admits the grid needs massive modernization. Domestic reports highlight that the country “can no longer avoid energy reform”.

The problem is that reform costs money, and money is something sanctions have been designed to deny. Washington has recently expanded sanctions on the Islamic Republic’s energy trade and targeted a wider network of companies, openly seeking to cut off the country’s revenue streams. Under Trump’s presidency, this pressure has only intensified. In other words, Iran’s crisis also has a deeply political component.

Thus far, Tehran’s response has been both pragmatic and geopolitical: it is further turning to Russia and China.

The Islamic Republic in fact is planning a large-scale nuclear expansion with Russian-built reactors forming the backbone of its future baseload capacity. As John Calabrese (a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute) notes, the partnership with Moscow and Beijing could help Iran not only overcome immediate shortages but also modernize its aging infrastructure; Russian reactors could stabilize the grid, while Chinese solar investments harness the country’s immense solar potential.

No wonder the Persian state is deepening ties with both. Tehran’s energy pivot, as a matter of fact, is part of a broader trend: for one thing, Iran’s military and strategic cooperation with Russia continues to advance. Following the so-called Twelve-Day War, the two countries have only strengthened their coordination, particularly in deterrence planning and intelligence sharing.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s role is not merely economic. For instance, Iran is open to considering a Russia–China-backed plan for cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — an unmistakable sign of Tehran’s Eastward diplomatic trajectory. Iran is also planning to vastly expand its regional power exchange networks by 2029.

These developments indicate that energy today is tied to sovereignty and survival. Tehran knows its stability depends on keeping power running, water available, and air breathable. With Western pressure blatantly aimed at cutting its revenue, turning eastward becomes the natural choice. Ironically enough, the more Washington squeezes Iran, the closer Tehran moves to the very powers the US sees as its main rivals.

This shift is not only about easing urgent domestic shortages. It is also about embedding Iran in the long run into a Eurasian energy network where Russia and China are becoming central players, thereby turning the country from a relatively isolated actor into a regional energy conduit; and that fits neatly within long-term Eurasian integration projects.

Iran’s domestic energy profile, however, remains skewed. Enerdata shows the country still relies heavily on natural gas and inefficient thermal plants. Overreliance on gas leaves Iran vulnerable during extreme summers and drought conditions that restrict hydropower. Burning mazut, meanwhile, is a drastic response to shortages, worsening pollution and public discontent. But the West misunderstands something important: Iran is not passively collapsing under pressure, but further repositioning itself; and its pivot is accelerating.

Western observers often portray Iran’s crisis as a prelude to internal collapse, which may reflect a degree of wishful thinking. A more accurate reading is that Tehran is realigning itself within broader global shifts. Relations with Russia and China have never been entirely rosy, marked at times by mistrust and unmet expectations. Be as it may, Moscow and Beijing now offer Tehran what the West denies: technology, investment, and real strategic recognition. Iran’s move eastward is therefore less desperation than strategic recalibration.

Under Trump, the US has adopted a more confrontational posture, but pressure alone rarely reshapes nations and often produces the opposite effect. Tehran’s growing integration with Russia and China is the predictable result of years of sanctions that pushed Iran toward alternative power centres.

Iran’s energy crisis is real and serious, but it is also a catalyst. The pivot to Russia and China is not merely convenient; it reflects necessity and opportunity. Iran needs partners that can expand its nuclear capacity, support solar development, stabilize its grid, and help manage its water–energy nexus. In that sense, the crisis may yet reshape not only Iran’s domestic trajectory but the wider balance of power across the region.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Categories: Analysis

Tags: China, energy, Geopolitics, Iran, Russia, USA