Targeting Cuba: Neo-Monroeism, The Iran Crisis, And The Logic Of A Two-Front Quagmire
By Uriel Araujo
As the Iran conflict drags on, an attempt at pivoting appears to be underway in US strategy. Reports suggest Cuba is re-entering Washington’s regime-change calculus under a revived neo-Monroeist logic. The US may find itself instead entrapped in two quagmires at the same time.

Recent reports indicate that Washington may be preparing contingencies for military action against Havana, even as it remains entangled in a costly and increasingly unpopular confrontation with Iran. Lee Schlenker, a researcher at the Quincy Institute, notes that the Trump administration appears to be quietly laying the groundwork for escalation in Cuba, despite the absence of any immediate provocation that would justify such a move. The timing might not be coincidental.
In response, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel has struck a defiant tone, warning that the island is ready to defend itself against any aggression, even at enormous costs. Reportedly, Havana’s is preparing for a coming attack amid mounting US pressure and an energy blockade.
American media outlets and policy circles have begun floating the idea, asking whether Cuba might indeed be “next”.
Such a development, albeit seemingly surprising in itself, is the logical extension of a (neo-Monroeist) policy trajectory that has been unfolding for months. Back in February, I argued that Washington’s strategy had shifted from traditional sanctions to something closer to full-spectrum economic asphyxiation. In this context, Trump’s declaration of a “national emergency” aimed at penalizing countries supplying oil to Cuba marked a qualitative escalation, thus tightening the noose around an already fragile economy.
This goes beyond a traditional embargo, aiming at systemic collapse. By cutting fuel, remittances, and finance, Washington bets unrest will drive regime change. A similar logic has failed in Venezuela so far; Cuba, moreover, presents a more cohesive political system and a disciplined security apparatus, making a rapid collapse scenario unlikely.
Thus far, the pressure campaign has been economic and psychological. Yet, as I argued before, history suggests that such campaigns often precede more direct forms of intervention.
The current moment is of course particularly volatile because it intersects with another, far more dangerous theater: the Middle East. The disastrous US-Israeli war against Iran, especially around Hormuz, has exposed the limits of American power projection, to say the least, with mounting costs and unclear gains from anyone’s perspective. It is true, however, that, despite all the losses, Iran is arguably emerging as a Great Power or at the very least one in the making.
Under these conditions, the temptation to open a new front closer to home becomes somewhat easier to understand. Not to lose face and to deflect from the Iranian disaster, Trump, in his characteristic ways, may well revert to his previous neo-Monroeist script. Cuba offers a familiar enough stage: geographically proximate, politically symbolic, and historically embedded in the American strategic imagination, so to speak – the “honor of taking Cuba”, in the US President’s words. In any case, such a move would carry enormous risks.
There are already enough signs of this shift. Congressional discussions about Cuba’s supposed ties with Russia and broader security concerns are resurfacing, while reports suggest that the Pentagon may be reviewing operational scenarios for the island. Trump himself has hinted, in his typically blunt parlance, that Cuba could be on the agenda after the Iran conflict winds down: “Cuba is a failing nation, and we’re going to do this, and we may stop by Cuba after we’re finished with this [Iran].”
Meanwhile, Trump’s political base is showing signs of strain. His aggressive posture toward Mexico and other Latin American nations is already alienating Hispanic voters. To further complicate things, there is an ongoing feud with the Pope himself: Latin Americans are overwhelmingly Catholic, and such tensions risk alienating not only Latinos but Catholics more broadly. Thus, what was once a strong coalition (with unprecedented Hispanic support, for a Republican Party President) is fracturing. A Cuba misadventure could very well be the last blow to Trumpism.
American hawks argue that Cuba’s internal vulnerabilities make it ripe for change. Yet similar arguments have been made for decades, underestimating the resilience of the Cuban state time and time again. There has been no “regime change” in Tehran and there is no guarantee there will be one in Havana. Foreign aggression instead tends to strengthen the national governments under attack, especially if the country starts to frame the situation as an existential threat. The notion of national liberation is very much rooted in Cuba’s (socialist) political imagination just as martyrdom and resistance is in Iran’s (Shia) mentality.
Moreover, the stakes in the American continent are sufficiently high: Cuba is not isolated. China has expanded its economic footprint in the Caribbean, and any strike on Chinese-linked infrastructure would risk escalation. Regional actors like Mexico and Brazil would also face pressure to respond diplomatically or economically.
A blockade or military action in Cuba would have severe humanitarian costs: fuel shortages could cripple services and drive migration toward US borders. This is the paradox of sorts at the heart of the strategy: the chaos it seeks to exploit may end up rebounding against its own maker.
Moreover, Washington is overstretched enough in the Middle East, with a depleted arsenal (and even delaying weapons deliveries to Western allies, due to the Iranian war); facing also Latin American theatre, in this context, would thus further overburden the Atlantic superpower.
There is, however, also an underreported dimension to this unfolding crisis, as domestic and external pressures within the US are intensifying in ways that may be shaping foreign policy decisions in a “pro-Israel” manner: the Epstein scandal has resurfaced, in a manner that further indicates, as I’ve written, that elements within the administration could be subject to political blackmail, namely the President and the First Lady themselves.
So instead of retreating from the Persian Gulf and pivoting to the Western Hemisphere, Washington may turn out to find itself entrapped in two quagmires.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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