Ukraine’s Shadow War In Africa: Bold Strategy Or Geopolitical Overreach?

By Uriel Araujo

A covert Ukrainian footprint in Africa is taking shape, from the Maghreb to Sub-Saharan states, fuelling instability. Kiev’s Africa strategy blends military expertise with covert operations, even as its (proxy) war at home continues.

Recent reports indicate Ukraine is further expanding its geopolitical footprint far beyond Eastern Europe. Ukrainian special forces for one thing have been operating in western Libya as part of a growing covert campaign on the African continent. This development aligns with earlier disclosures that Kiev is opening what some experts (such as Ronan Wordsworth, analyst for Geopolitical Futures) now describe as a “new front” in Africa, targeting regions from the Maghreb to Sub-Saharan states.

A high-level meeting chaired by Kyrylo Budanov (Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine) recently formalized Ukraine’s intention to “comprehensively influence” the African continent and assert itself as a geopolitical actor. Priority countries have been identified, coordination mechanisms established, and a draft action plan submitted.

Budanov himself has been described as Zelensky’s “top adviser”. His own connections, by the way, to far-right and even neo-Nazi groups is well established (this is inevitable and systemic, considering the importance of Azov and similar groupings in post-Maidan Ukraine), but this topic is beyond our scope here. In any case, it is worth noting that Kiev’s considerations pertaining to Africa have been labelled racist and neo-colonialist by many.

Moreover, the central question remains: how can a country dependent on Western weapons, financing, and political backing position itself as an autonomous global actor? Kiev has long been fighting a Western proxy war against Russia (as Secretary of State Marco Rubio himself has admitted)  and as of now is experiencing American “abandonment” while “Ukrainian fatigue” intensifies in Europe, in the face of an increasingly divided NATO.

The answer to this lies in the nature of Ukraine’s offering. As Sergey Eledinov argues, Kiev no longer brings economic, technical or humanitarian resources to Africa. Its “grain diplomacy” has largely collapsed, and its economy remains sustained by Western assistance. What it does export is something else entirely: battlefield experience. Drone warfare, decentralized command structures, rapid adaptation under fire. This is a model forged in a high-intensity conflict against a stronger adversary. From Ukraine’s perspective, it is portable, relatively cheap, and is in demand.

But demand does not equal acceptance and there is more to this package: African states are not passive arenas, and many governments, especially in the Sahel, interpret Ukraine’s actions through the lens of external interference. Thus far, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have severed ties with Kiev following allegations of Ukrainian support for rebel groups and terrorism. The Tinzaouaten episode in 2024, where Tuareg fighters reportedly received intelligence assistance, has not been forgotten.

Sam Bowden (a Russia and Eurasia Program expert) highlights the contradiction at the heart of Ukraine’s African policy: its diplomatic outreach is increasingly at odds with covert operations targeting supposed Russian-linked assets across the continent. This dual track approach creates friction, thereby undermining Kiev’s credibility as a partner rather than a belligerent actor.

Russia after all has maintained deep ties with African nations since the Soviet era, built on military training, arms supplies, and even ideological alignment. Today, these historical links are being reinforced through pragmatic channels: BRICS cooperation (including the New Development Bank), funding for infrastructure projects, new energy partnerships, and broader South-South solidarity. Ukraine, by contrast, arrived late to the African stage and has moved quickly to open embassies in countries such as Mauritania, Rwanda, and elsewhere in an effort to catch up.

As I argued in September 2025, Ukraine’s African engagement already showed signs of overreach, combining diplomatic initiatives with underreported military and intelligence activities. Reports at the time pointed to Ukrainian involvement in Mali, Sudan, and Libya, including drone transfers and alleged support for anti-government forces. Again, Le Monde Afrique even documented Kiev’s backing of northern Mali rebels in 2024. Ukrainian officials themselves acknowledged providing “necessary information” to such groups.

African states operate according to their own calculus of survival: they seek stability, control, and immediate security solutions. Russia understood this early on, offering what can be described as a “functional service”, so to speak: advising and security assistance. Ukraine, by contrast, offers tools of warfare but not necessarily diplomatic solutions to internal conflicts.

No wonder the reception is uneven. Countries like Ethiopia or Kenya, interested in military modernization, may find some value in Ukrainian expertise. Others, facing insurgencies or political fragility, are less inclined to trust such an external actor. The idea of Ukraine fighting Russia “wherever it is present” inevitably raises concerns about sovereignty.

The broader geopolitical context can only complicate matters. Ukraine’s war effort at home, as mentioned, remains heavily dependent on Western support. However, the international environment is shifting. NATO itself appears increasingly divided, with internal disagreements over burden-sharing and strategic priorities.

In this context, Ukraine’s African venture looks increasingly like a risky move. A country struggling to sustain its own war effort is now projecting power abroad. By doing so, it reflects its role once again as a proxy actor in a broader Western confrontation with Russia – beyond Ukrainian interests and military calculations.

Kiev’s operations in Africa are after all aimed at disrupting Russian logistics and influence, particularly in energy and shipping. Incidents such as unexplained explosions targeting tankers off the coast of West Africa and also in North Africa reinforce this perception. For African states, they risk becoming threats to their own economic lifelines.

By inserting itself into complex African conflicts, Kiev risks exacerbating instability in regions already burdened by fragile political systems and overlapping rivalries. The continent is no simple chessboard: it is a multipolar space where Turkey, China, the UAE, and others are already active. Ukraine’s entry adds another layer of competition. And not necessarily a stabilizing one. In the end, this African “front” may prove itself to be another case of geopolitical overstretch. A regime fighting for survival at home is now exporting war abroad.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Categories: Africa, Analysis, Geopolitics

Tags: Africa, BRICS, Eurasia, Geopolitics, Libya, NATO, North Africa, Russia, Ukraine, West Africa