Brazil Isn’t Another Venezuela, But Washington’s Economic Pressure Is Already Taking Shape

By Uriel Araujo

Washington’s decision to classify Brazil’s PCC and CV gangs as terrorist organizations is being presented as a security measure. Yet the move also expands US sanctions powers and raises questions about financial pressure, BRICS, Pix, and Washington’s broader strategy toward Brazil. Military action remains unlikely, but economic leverage is already taking shape.

Washington’s decision to designate Brazil’s drug gangs Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), as terrorist entities marks yet another significant escalation in US-Brazil relations.

Announced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the measure places Brazilian criminal organizations within the same legal framework increasingly applied by the Trump administration to Latin American criminal organizations.

Officially, the move is presented as part of the fight against transnational crime. Yet the broader context indicates a wider geopolitical agenda. Such terrorist designations are far from symbolic. They expand Washington’s ability to impose sanctions, freeze assets, prosecute alleged supporters, and pressure financial institutions across borders. This is precisely why Brazilian authorities have consistently opposed such classifications.

One may recall that Brazil rejected a similar American request in 2025, arguing that PCC and CV are profit-driven criminal organizations rather than ideologically motivated terrorist groups. Prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya recently warned that the designation could actually complicate Brazil’s own efforts against organized crime.

Again, the issue cannot be separated from larger geopolitical developments. Last year, I argued that Washington’s pressure on Brazil regarding gang designations, sanctions against Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, and even discussions about access to strategic military facilities were part of the Trump administration’s new Monroe Doctrine. The goal was not necessarily military intervention, but leverage. Brazil’s growing role within BRICS, its strategic partnership with China, and its increasingly independent foreign policy have made it a target of pressure. Today’s designation appears to fit neatly within that framework.

The economic implications could prove far more important than the security dimension. Analysts have warned that the designation may increase compliance costs for Brazilian companies and financial institutions. To be sure, major banks currently see limited short-term impacts – for now. The broader concern here is the expansion of US extraterritorial financial influence.

Perhaps the most underreported aspect of the debate concerns precisely Brazil’s financial sovereignty. Economist José Kobori argues that Washington has effectively acquired a powerful new instrument to pressure Brazilian companies, banks, and potentially even the Pix payment system.

Pix for one thing represents something larger than a payment platform. It is a successful example of Brazilian financial sovereignty that reduced dependence on foreign-controlled payment networks. Visa, Mastercard and Meta’s WhatsApp Pay all struggled to compete against Brazil’s public infrastructure. Thus, if counterterrorism regulations become a vehicle for increased pressure on Brazilian financial institutions, Pix could find itself indirectly in Washington’s crosshairs.

This should also be viewed within the broader context of BRICS countries efforts to reduce reliance on dollar-centric financial systems. As I noted previously, institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank represent  a still modest but real challenge to American financial dominance. From that perspective, targeting Brazil’s financial infrastructure would amount to a form of economic warfare rather than a simple anti-crime initiative.

What about military action?

Here, speculation has intensified following Washington’s operation in Venezuela earlier this year. In January 2026, US forces captured President Nicolas Maduro and transferred him to the United States to face long-standing narcoterrorism charges.

Unlike Maduro, President Lula da Silva faces no criminal charges in the United States. Moreover, Brazil is not an isolated state under sanctions but rather Latin America’s largest economy, a BRICS founder, and an influential Global South power. A Venezuela-style operation against Brazil would thus constitute an act of aggression carrying enormous diplomatic, economic and military consequences.

A far more realistic scenario might involve intelligence cooperation, sanctions and financial pressure. Mexico offers an instructive enough precedent. Recent US-backed operations against cartels have relied heavily on intelligence sharing and operational support. Yet even there, unilateral American military operations remain politically toxic.

As I wrote earlier this year, cartel decapitation strategies often produce unintended consequences. In Mexico, the elimination of major cartel leaders triggered retaliatory violence, blockades and instability rather than lasting security gains.

Brazil presents an even more complicated environment. PCC and CV are deeply embedded in prison systems, local economies and regional criminal networks. A blunt external intervention could easily worsen the situation.

Furthermore, Washington is already stretched across multiple fronts, from tensions involving Iran to growing legal and political campaigns against Cuba. Therefore direct military action against Brazil appears unlikely enough for the foreseeable future, even though Washington has recently demonstrated willingness to carry out all kinds of disastrous measures (see Iran).

The real issue here is leverage.

Whether through sanctions, financial compliance mechanisms, intelligence cooperation, or diplomatic pressure, Washington is expanding its toolkit, so to speak. The terrorist designation grants new legal authorities that can be selectively employed in future disputes. This is entirely consistent with Trump’s broader approach, which often treats tariffs, sanctions and legal instruments as negotiating tools.

To sum it up, Brazil is unlikely to become another Venezuela. Yet the designation matters because it provides Washington with new mechanisms to pressure a country that occupies an increasingly important position within BRICS and the Global South. Again, military action remains improbable. Economic coercion, however, is already underway.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Categories: Analysis, Economy, Geopolitics, International Affairs

Tags: America, Brazil, BRICS, drugs, Economy, Geopolitics, Global South, Latin America, USA, Venezuela