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The EU’s Anti-Russian Sanctions Are Colliding With Europe’s Orthodox Christianity

By Editor on 19th July 2026 • ( 0 )

The EU’s Anti-Russian Sanctions Are Colliding With Europe’s Orthodox Christianity

The EU’s latest sanctions package has exposed deep divisions over Russia, with Bulgaria blocking measures against Patriarch Kirill and other key figures. Italy has echoed Bulgaria’s concerns. Is Europe’s foreign policy starting to mirror the domestic “Maidanization” trend one can see across Europe?

The European Union (EU) is once again divided over how far to push sanctions against Moscow. The bloc’s latest effort (the 21st sanctions package) has been softened after Bulgaria vetoed key proposals. Bulgaria objected to targeting Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Vagit Alekperov, founder of Lukoil, Russia’s largest private oil company.

These names were removed from the draft list following Bulgaria’s firm stance, alongside other compromises such as the dropping of proposed restrictions on Russian fish and seafood imports, and a proposed shorter freeze on the oil price cap.

In addition, Greece is seeking exemptions to keep shipping Russian LNG to non-EU states, while Austria is still pushing for sanctions relief pertaining to assets connected to Raiffeisen Bank.

These developments come even after Hungary’s political shift away from Viktor Orban, who had previously blocked similar measures. European commentators are saying the veto baton, so to speak, has simply passed to Bulgaria under Prime Minister Rumen Radev, as unanimity rules mean one holdout can still reshape the entire package.

There is an important element in this discussion that goes even beyond matters of economy and finances: Bulgaria’s foreign minister, Velislava Petrova-Chamova, has argued that sanctions should deliver real financial impact rather than serve as “symbolic gestures”. Sanctioning Kirill, she warned, risked fuelling EU scepticism in Christian Orthodox nations like Bulgaria, by stirring anti-EU rhetoric.

Patriarch Kirill has voiced strong support for Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, describing aspects of the conflict in spiritual terms. Yet one may argue that singling him out and thereby placing a major religious figure under asset freezes and travel bans would amount to religious persecution.

Now, this is no abstract concern: as the United Nations Human Rights Office (OHCHR) warns, Ukraine itself has pursued aggressive moves against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), seizing monasteries, harassing clergy, and advancing laws that threaten its operations even despite the church’s efforts to assert autonomy from Moscow. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns over these developments since at least 2024, noting that “legitimate security issues” do not justify broad infringements on religious freedom.

As I have written before, parallel to such developments in post-Maidan Ukraine, there is a broader “Maidanization” of Europe’s policies and debates, that often translate into what critics describe as outright Russophobia, as seen in Estonia, for instance.

In other words, when EU discussions turn to sanctioning church patriarchs over their proclamations, this echoes the same Russophobic overreach seen in Kiev – an increasing tendency to frame Russian cultural, linguistic, and religious institutions primarily through a security lens. In Ukraine, policies have effectively targeted Russian-speakers and Orthodox communities, relegating them to second-class status in ways that even the Venice Commission and UN human rights officials have flagged.

It is not surprising then that such campaigns draw criticism from across the Christian world: the Vatican, for instance, has opposed sanctions against Patriarch Kirill. Roman Catholic voices were already disturbed by Kiev’s 2024 response to Pope Francis’s calls for negotiations.

Moreover, if religious leaders can face sanctions for their stance on current conflicts, consistency would demand scrutiny of others. Evangelical Christians in the US and elsewhere, for instance, often voice strong support for Israel, amid the campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. Under the same logic, could they be sanctioned?

Meanwhile, Christians in general already face growing intolerance in Europe, as the European Centre for Law & Justice itself admits. A 2025 OSCE report as well as monitoring by groups like OIDAC Europe document high levels of vandalism, arson, and attacks on churches and worshippers. Within this wider context of anti-Christian intolerance, Orthodox Christian minorities could be particularly vulnerable.

This “Maidanization” trend, as I call it, extends domestically across parts of Europe. A number of key countries have seen political persecution of parties labelled “pro-Russian,” bans on Soviet or Russian symbols and flags (even on Victory Day commemorations in Germany), and rising intolerance.

Anti-Russian speech has also fuelled neo-Nazi speech in Baltic countries and elsewhere. Moreover, amid Europe’s “new Cold War”, accusations of Russian sympathy function as a political litmus test: the European campaign to selectively ban “populist” parties, and the cases of Le Pen in France, and AfD in Germany illustrate how dissenting voices can be stigmatized, monitored, or legally constrained.

This, to a certain (comparatively modest) extent, mirrors Zelensky’s banning of 11 “pro-Russian” parties in Ukraine – basically the entire opposition.

In any case, Europe’s radical Russophobia collides with geopolitical, geoeconomic, and demographic realities. The European bloc remains home to significant Orthodox populations: Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus, for example, all have strong Eastern Orthodox majorities or pluralities. Cultural and historical ties to Russia run deep in these societies.

Moreover, energy dependence persists. The bloc is struggling to find alternatives to Russian energy: EU countries imported record volumes of Russian LNG in the first half of 2026, with France, Belgium, and Spain leading purchases from facilities like Yamal – paying billions even as a full import ban looms in 2027.

Thus, the current debate on sanctions reveals deeper contradictions. Italy has joined Bulgaria in opposing moves against Kirill, citing concerns over the Vatican and implications for targeting spiritual leaders.

Ultimately, sanctioning Patriarchs or freezing out major energy players risks alienating parts of Europe’s own population (not to mention the economic backlash) and undermining the very unity Brussels claims to defend.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.