Europe’s Rearmament Is Reviving A Dangerous Franco-German Rivalry

By Uriel Araujo

Europe’s military buildup masks growing tensions between France and Germany over defence, industry, and strategic leadership. The collapse of FCAS, renewed industrial nationalism, and continued dependence on Washington reveal a divided Europe still bent on entering on a dangerous confrontation with Russia.

As Europe struggles to rearm itself amid rising transatlantic frictions and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, an old ghost has returned: French-German military and industrial rivalry is re-emerging once again, in an increasingly divided continent.

Foreign Policy columnist Caroline de Gruyter summed up the tensions sharply in a recent column, arguing that Europe is back in 1952, with France and Germany locked into military rivalry that spells trouble for the rest of the continent.

The most visible sign of this came in June, when France and Germany formally abandoned the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), their ambitious joint fighter jet program. Launched in 2017 to replace France’s Rafale and Germany’s (and Spain’s) Eurofighter fleets, FCAS was meant to showcase European defence cooperation at a time of uncertain US support. Instead, it collapsed amid bitter disagreements between France’s Dassault Aviation and Germany’s Airbus. Companies clashed over leadership, intellectual property, work-sharing, and who would control key technologies. Political leaders, including President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz, could not bridge the gap.

This was no minor setback. As some analysts have noted, the failure highlighted Europe’s long-standing coordination problem, where national industrial interests and differing strategic cultures (France’s focus on sovereignty and global reach versus Germany’s preference for NATO integration) keep trumping joint ambitions.

Other projects have stalled too: the KNDS tank initiative has faced delays; naval cooperation between Naval Group and ThyssenKrupp remains competitive rather than collaborative; and space efforts show similar fragmentation, with Germany planning an independent military satellite network, and an ongoing launcher crisis (as scholars Nina Klimburg-Witjes and Joseph Popper have described it).

One may recall that post-war European integration began precisely to prevent such rivalries from spiralling again. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early 1950s placed key defense-related industries under supranational control with the motto “no more war.” Today, the two biggest EU economies are increasingly investing in national champions rather than shared capabilities. This is bad news for smaller states that cannot afford solo programs and rely on joint efforts for efficiency.

As de Gruyter observes, trust between Paris and Berlin (the traditional motor of integration) is breaking down at a delicate time.

Re-arming Western Europe would require re-industrializing it, a process that has proven difficult, to say the least, despite some progress. As I’ve argued before, whenever Europeans try to articulate a stronger industrial policy, Washington has stepped in to protect American market access. It is worth recalling that when the EU floated plans for a new European Defence Fund and new weapons systems, US officials from the first Trump administration (notably Jim Mattis) pushed hard for American companies to get a share of the funds. This did not change be it under Trump 2.0 or Biden.

As Sophia Besch and Max Bergmann noted in Foreign Affairs, the US has worked consistently to maintain its dominant position in Europe’s defence market. The bloc’s subsidy initiatives discussed in recent years emerged partly in response to US measures that threatened the continent’s industry – often described as a “subsidy war”.

Yet Europe remains heavily dependent on American systems; spending on US defence systems and equipment surged in recent years. It is therefore unsurprising that Paris and Berlin find it hard to align when external pressures and internal competition pull in different directions.

Thus far, the EU has also shown willingness to cede ground in other strategic areas. Its participation in the US-led Pax Silica initiative, for instance, has given up digital sovereignty. The habit of aligning closely with Washington appears deeply ingrained, even as the US keeps shifting more and more of the Ukrainian “burden” onto the shoulder of its partners, a trend that started under Biden.

Be as it may, the broader Western bloc shows growing divisions. NATO’s eastern pillar faces uncertainties (with Polish-German differences), while a “Turkish Question” adds to these fractures.

Ironically, some of the most direct pressures and threats against Europe have come from across the Atlantic, as seen with Trump’s plans for Greenland. Yet European capitals remain committed to shouldering a heavier load in Ukraine and pursue NATO expansion in the north – moves that bring the continent closer to direct confrontation with Russia.

Kyiv itself continues operations that risk drawing Europe deeper in, such as efforts aimed at isolating Crimea, even as Russian forces make steady advances on the ground.

As Washington shifts burdens, the continent appears ready to accept greater risks without resolving its own internal divisions. Franco-German competition, highlighted even in relation to defence ties with partners like India, further complicates broader EU security cooperation.

The collapse of FCAS and stalled projects signal that a somewhat belated industrial nationalism is resurfacing. Germany has moved forward with its own Team Gen 6 fighter effort, while France protects its national champions (such as Dassault Aviation, Thales, and Safran).

To be clear, there is some cooperation (recent Macron-Merz meetings discussed nuclear exercises and other areas) but fundamental tensions persist. While smaller European states increasingly coordinate through regional groupings such as the Nordic-Baltic Eight, the political and industrial leadership required for major defence initiatives still rests largely with Paris and Berlin.

So much for the idea of a unified European strategic autonomy. Europe is committing hundreds of billions into defence (spending rose by 20% in 2025) but without better rules on work-sharing and genuine joint planning, much of this risks becoming inefficient.

American pressure and intra-European rivalries are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive: ultimately, Washington has relied on an increasingly “vassalized” Europe to sustain the Western proxy war in Ukraine, while occasionally threatening its own European “allies” too, as seen with Greenland. And the European continent still seems eager to enter into a dangerous NATO confrontation with Russia – even at a time when the bloc remains divided and with a dangerous French-German intra-European military rivalry.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Categories: Analysis, Europe, Geopolitics

Tags: EU, Europe, France, Geopolitics, Germany, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, USA