Trump-Xi-Putin Summit In Shenzhen: The End Of Uncontested US Primacy
By Uriel Araujo
The coming Trump-Xi-Putin summit in Shenzhen reveals a shifting global balance of power and the emergence of a multipolar world. As Washington faces strategic overstretch, China and Russia are reshaping the diplomatic landscape.

China has confirmed that President Xi Jinping will host US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin for a trilateral summit, which is being described as “historic”, in Shenzhen on November 19 – on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ meeting.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the three leaders will hold in-depth exchanges on safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability among major powers. The significance of Shenzhen is not necessarily what the three leaders will agree upon, but what the very existence of this meeting tells us about the changing structure of international power.
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were the two main poles of power. After 1991, Washington apparently became the undisputed centre of the international system. Now, the American President is traveling to China for a meeting hosted by Xi Jinping, alongside the Russian leader.
This illustrates a redistribution of diplomatic centrality: America remains enormously powerful, yet can no longer dictate the diplomatic agenda unilaterally. Possessing the greatest concentration of power and the ability to organize the international system around one’s own preferences are two different things, after all.
As I argued earlier (when commenting on Iran), the question is not whether America is about to “collapse”, but whether it can adapt to an emerging multipolar environment. The paradox of American power is that the United States remains sufficiently powerful to intervene almost everywhere – but increasingly struggles to translate its enormous military, financial and technological capabilities into sustainable geopolitical outcomes.
Washington faces several overlapping challenges: the Iran war’s consequences for regional stability, energy markets and maritime security; the conflict in Eastern Europe; strategic competition with China; and the diversification of international financial and trade relationships.
Pursuing all these goals simultaneously, while absorbing their considerable economic and strategic costs, is a classic manifestation of imperial overstretch. Repeated conflicts, sanctions and tariff pressures have also strained alliances and encouraged alternative economic arrangements – as illustrated by de-dollarization trends within BRICS and the growing autonomy sought by countries across an increasingly non-aligned Global South.
Russia and China are not identical actors, but their interests increasingly converge around autonomy from Western financial structures, resistance to unilateral sanctions and opposition to a US-dominated international order.
Multipolarity, in any case, does not require a unified anti-American bloc.
China possesses enormous economic, industrial and technological weight – while Russia retains considerable military, nuclear, energy and geopolitical leverage. The United States in turn has formidable military, financial, technological and alliance capabilities. These different forms of power make the emerging system more complex.
The coming Shenzhen summit meeting demonstrates, above all, that Washington must increasingly negotiate with other centres of power that possess their own strategic agendas and diplomatic alternatives.
Xi Jinping is not simply another participant here: as host, China has the opportunity to present itself as a central interlocutor. Chinese analysts have stressed that the meeting is about strengthening strategic communication rather than carving up spheres of influence – and that it aligns with the trend toward multipolarity.
Comparisons with Yalta are inevitable yet limited. In 1945 the three principal Allied powers met near the end of a world war, with armies occupying vast territories. Today, the three countries are neither a unified victorious coalition nor the only relevant centres of power. India, Brazil, Iran, Turkey and others have their own agendas and cannot be framed as passive objects of any agreement.
In other words, the emerging polycentric order cannot simply be negotiated into existence by three great powers, however consequential their combined influence may be.
A more accurate reading is that Shenzhen potentially represents a world in which the world’s three largest nuclear powers recognize the necessity of direct communication – without necessarily agreeing on just how the international system should be organized.
Regarding the Ukraine question, Xi reportedly resisted treating it as a straightforward trilateral agenda item, arguing that Europeans should be involved in discussions about a European conflict. There is an irony here. Europe has substantial economic resources yet remains heavily dependent on American military capabilities.
Multipolarity is not necessarily emerging through an alliance against the United States, but through an increasing number of countries no longer considering alignment with Washington indispensable to their economic development, security or international legitimacy.
The United States is not collapsing – nor is it ceasing to be a first-tier power. What is changing is its ability to translate overwhelming material capabilities into political outcomes and to organize the international system around its own preferences.
In that sense, Shenzhen, in all likelihood, will be remembered not as a new Yalta – but as another indication that the post-Cold War moment of uncontested American primacy is giving way to something considerably more complex: a world in which even Washington must negotiate the terms of international order with others.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
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Categories: Analysis, Geopolitics, International Affairs
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