Trump Isn’t Leaving The Ukraine War, He’s Moving It To Russia’s Energy Sector

By Uriel Araujo

Washington is increasingly concentrated on Russian energy and critical mineral assets despite rhetoric of reduced involvement in Ukraine. The Treasury’s recent actions increase American oversight of major transactions, while sanctions coordination involving Trump and allies reinforces pressure on Moscow’s energy sector.

Even as the Trump administration has “withdrawn” from Ukraine, it has sharpened its focus on Russian energy assets, further opening a new front in the broader geopolitical contest: for one thing, Washington has allowed a sanctions waiver on Russian seaborne oil that would have expired around June 17, signalling readiness to restore tighter restrictions.

Moreover, at the G7 summit, President Trump sought to project strength in his characteristic bravado style, declaring “I’m the boss”, while signalling greater alignment with Ukraine’s war aims and endorsing a coordinated sanctions campaign against Moscow.

In London, meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer (who recently announced his resignation), echoed that tougher stance by pledging additional sanctions on Moscow alongside expanded support for Ukraine’s nuclear energy sector.

Beyond sanctions rhetoric, however, the point is that Washington has also been exercising growing influence over transactions involving Russian energy assets. One notable example is the Treasury Department’s decision to extend negotiations over the disposal of Lukoil’s international assets, reportedly worth about $22 billion.

The move preserves US oversight of any eventual sale and keeps open the possibility that Western firms could participate should a deal proceed. This includes ExxonMobil, Chevron, and American private equity such as the Carlyle Group (known for its historical ties to the Bush family circle), among others.

Together with continuing sanctions on Russian oil and gas giants such as Rosneft (and talks of expanding them), these measures point to a broader strategy of widening US hold over Russian energy assets, even if they stop well short of seeking direct ownership of Russia’s state-controlled companies.

Proceeds from such deals often flow into frozen US-jurisdiction accounts, placing Washington in a stronger negotiating position, without direct upfront payments to the Russian firms. Thus, the Trump administration is tightening oversight of transactions involving Russian state-owned resource companies, by extending General License 131 series, for example, while requiring OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) approval; this is expanding American influence over these strategic assets.

That reflects a deeper US obsession with energy and critical minerals. Even if Washington steps back from direct involvement in Ukraine, some analysts argue the Atlantic superpower is seeking greater “control” or stakes in Russia’s natural resource sector as the ultimate prize.

In this scenario, Washington, counting on its “allies” (even with all the ongoing transatlantic tensions considered), could still push Russia’s encirclement across the Arctic-Baltic, Central Europe, and elsewhere. And then “leverage” that to try to pursue what eluded the US even in the 1990s: namely, direct influence over state-owned energy and minerals giants.

Negotiations so far include energy cooperation talks, which the Kremlin, in a pragmatic way, has publicly confirmed to some extent; however, US interests could ultimately extend to seeking greater participation in future resource projects or even include controlling stakes – potentially limiting China’s future access to strategic resources.

Too much is being made, however, of the recent Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow-area oil refineries – to reinforce perceptions that pressure could yield concessions. Beyond the smoke and dramatic visual effects, the actual damage remains relatively limited and quickly repairable.

One may recall, in any case, that Trump has long emphasized resources in his deal-making approach. Past proposals reportedly have included offering Putin access to Alaskan natural resources in exchange for “ending the war”.

So far one can only speculate so much, but this would fit a broader pattern: Washington has long pushed to shift the Ukrainian “burden” onto its European allies, as I’ve written before.

Ukraine’s intensified attacks on Russian infrastructure, including repeated strikes on a key Gazprom refinery in Moscow’s Kapotnya district, could reportedly reduce refining capacity, creating domestic fuel pressures. These actions seem to be aimed at “cornering” Russia economically, thereby (conveniently enough) providing for Washington with greater room for manoeuvre in any negotiations – even if no direct American orchestration of specific Ukrainian strikes is publicly evident so far.

The potential outcome, in any case, aligns with Western goals of revenue denial and forcing concessions. One should keep in mind, nonetheless, that Moscow has already absorbed dozens of similar strikes across the country before, and has mitigated this through increased crude exports, imports of refined products where needed, and operational adjustments at undamaged facilities. In other words, the Ukrainian attacks generate useful propaganda imagery and tactical disruption, but their strategic effect is quite overstated.

Be as it may, this energy-minerals drive is central to Trump’s foreign policy pertaining to the Arctic and elsewhere: Big Tech and AI interests exert heavy influence, demanding vast supplies of energy, data centres, and critical minerals.

That said, American megalomaniac maximalist goals aside, direct US controlling stakes in core Russian state-owned companies remain a stretch. Historically, Moscow has fiercely resisted foreign control over its strategic resources, this being a central sovereignty issue since the chaotic 1990s. Trump’s pattern thus far involves threats and deals, employing sanctions as leverage, as well as investments, and reciprocal resource access – rather than outright equity grabs inside adversarial states.

Real or more “realistic” US aims could be centred on revenue cuts, peace terms, and broader competition, particularly against China’s mineral dominance. Again, the incumbent American administration has pursued federal equity investments in domestic and allied critical minerals sectors, but Russian crown jewels, so to speak, are another matter entirely.

So much for Trump promoting good Russian-American relations. Despite rhetoric about offloading Ukraine to Europe, Washington maintains multiple points of contention with Moscow over energy, minerals, and the Arctic. In this context, Ukraine’s role as proxy creates pressure that indirectly benefits US bargaining power. American ambitions do not constitute an easy endeavour, though: Moscow will reject any attempt at foreign control over its strategic energy assets, viewing it as an existential threat to national sovereignty: it has repeatedly shown it is willing to endure severe economic pressure rather than surrender ownership of its energy crown jewels.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Categories: Analysis, Europe, Geopolitics, Russia

Tags: Central Europe, Donald Trump, energy, Europe, G7, Geopolitics, OFAC, oil production, Russia, The Arctic, The Baltics, UK, Ukraine, USA