Brazil’s Election: Bolsonaro Caught Between Trump, China And US Pressure

By Uriel Araujo

Brazil faces pressures to “choose” between Washington and Beijing as Flávio Bolsonaro signals closer US ties – amid accusations of US interference. Yet agribusiness and military concerns could prevent a decisive break with China and BRICS. Brazil in any case remains “encircled” under Washington’s neo-Monroeism.

Flavio Bolsonaro is the favourite to win Brazil’s presidential runoff on October 25,  slightly ahead of Lula da Silva, according to polls. His father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, remains under house arrest.

There are signs of political erosion in Lulism. Lula is 80, and his party has ruled the country for 18 of the last 24 years.

Many speculate that a Bolsonaro victory would trigger a foreign-policy realignment, swapping Chinese influence for alignment with the US – while distancing Brazil from BRICS. The Bolsonaro family is widely associated with the pro-American far-right.

That narrative has merits, but does not get the full picture. Flavio has already signalled limits, having stated he will work with both the US and China and will “not take sides,” insisting his side is “the Brazilian people”.

In his official policy platform he promises a diplomacy guided by “professionalism” rather than ideology – it would involve multiple engagements: from Beijing to the EU, and from Washington to Asian markets.

Even his more controversial brother, Eduardo Bolsonaro, once widely tipped for the Foreign Ministry, has written in similar terms: rebuild ties with the US while preserving economic opportunities with China, reducing asymmetries and scrutinizing sensitive sectors.

Flavio Bolsonaro is not his father. Jair Bolsonaro’s own government discovered the costs of ideology: Foreign Minister Ernesto Araujo’s open antagonism toward Beijing collided with agribusiness exporters dependent on the Chinese market. Congress, the farm lobby and military advisers pressed – until Araujo resigned in 2021.China buys 30% of Brazil’s agribusiness export revenue, against just 7% for the US – a structural reality no president can ignore.

Jair himself later sought closer commercial and nuclear-submarine cooperation with Russia, showing how rhetoric and practice may diverge.

Flavio’s own economic signals point the same way: while focused on spending restraint and market confidence, the team of technocrats drafting his fiscal and economic measures draws heavily from the pragmatist camp. It is thus reasonable to expect similar pragmatism in foreign policy.

Jerusalem offers another precedent: Jair, the father, had promised to move the Brazilian embassy there but later settled for a trade office after Middle Eastern partners threatened commercial retaliation. Flavio has repeated the embassy pledge, popular with part of his Evangelical base, yet the same trade calculus still applies.

The new Shield of the Americas (Counter Cartel Coalition) will be a powerful draw. This Washington-led international military and political coalition was established in March this year under Trump. Flavio has promised Brazil’s entry, framing it as a tool against drug gangs PCC and CV, and as a contrast with Lula. This coexists with Flavio’s explicit commitments to engage with Beijing.

Former Chancellor Celso Amorim and others call the initiative “encirclement,” treating organized crime as a US pretext for hemispheric control, as I’ve commented elsewhere. Brazilian military leaders draw a clear line: the generals seem to accept coordinated border operations – but view any permanent US base as a sovereignty risk.

The irony is that, under Washington’s neo-Monroeism, Brazil’s emerging food-superpower status, its agricultural and mineral weight continue to make it a strategic target for US pressure – regardless of who sits in the Planalto palace.

The United States is “no stranger” to meddling in other nations’ elections, and the Bolsonaro family’s links with Trump are well known. Eduardo Bolsonaro, for instance, has sought to influence Washington’s approach to Brazil, including pertaining to sanctions and tariffs against his own country.

Moreover, the US has been accused of interference in the ongoing elections. However, Brazil’s Federal Police closed its investigation into it; with no evidence so far. Flavio’s first-round lead over Lula is consistent with the decline of Lulism’s and polls.

Signs of judicial overreach against Bolsonaro have also emerged amid other Supreme Court scandals. Thus, whoever wins the election could see his victory challenged.

Nevertheless, the Bolsonaro’s connections with Trump could prove a dangerous ingredient in the current context.

The evidence so far suggests a Flavio administration would pursue closer political and security ties with Washington while preserving trade relations with China – but pressures could disrupt that picture.

With Argentina having applied to join NATO as a partner, Venezuela arguably under de facto control, and Colombia now presided over by Trump-endorsed Espriella (a US citizen and a Republican Party member and donor), Brazil will have to engage with the Shield of the Americas one way or the other.

It will have to do so while balancing national security concerns, sovereignty and nationalist demands – and trade with China as well as with Washington.

It will also have to take into consideration an increasingly aggressive superpower, bent on hemisphere supremacy, and an encircled Brazil under threats of possible American military action against drug gangs.

Despite Flavio’s “pragmatism”, his family’s US connection could certainly complicate that balancing act.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Categories: Analysis, Geopolitics, International Affairs

Tags: Brazil, BRICS, China, Geopolitics, neo-Monroeism, USA